Mar
18
Assessing the Anti-Communist Identity
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Assessing the Anti-Communist Identity
As a professor of Vietnamese Studies courses, one of the toughest topics to articulate to my students is the anti-communist ideology and identity in the Vietnamese American community.
That is, much of what is associated with the anti-communist identity are the recent protests by members in the community who believe that the heritage symbols of their refugee experiences are being attacked.
The most recent protest was against a Vietnamese American art exhibit called “F.O.B II: Art Speaks” that uses the communist flag as a statement to launch a discussion about freedom of expression. For example, one of the art works was an interactive voting booth that allows visitors to decide which flag represents them: the flag of the former Republic of South Vietnam, the official of flag of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, or create their own flag using crayons. The exhibit was in Santa Ana (CA), which opened at the beginning of this year but was forced to shut down earlier than scheduled due to community protest.
Interestingly, the exhibit’s organizers, many of whom are part of the so-called 1.5 generation of Vietnamese Americans who were born in Vietnam but mostly grew up in the US, stated that their display was a direct response to an earlier protest last year. That protest was against Nguoi Viet Daily News’ publication of an image of a foot spa painted with the colors of the South Vietnamese flag. There was “this prevailing fear round the Vietnamese community after the foot bath incident…the community was on this slippery slope, and we were not progressing toward having open dialogue and being more tolerant of different political views,” said one of the organizers. Although the exhibit’s organizers and advisory board members attempted to be “sensitive enough for the community,” they wanted “to confront the fear head on.” At least implicitly, the “F.O.B II” was to “test” whether the community is ready to respect the freedom for which it claimed to seek when they left Vietnam.
It has been said that people with extreme preferences and views (both left and right) are always disproportionately represented in community politics. So much so that too often the consequence is “clowns to the left and jokers to the right” in which such politics seems distant from the views of ordinary folks.
Perhaps because I am also a “1.5er” whose personal politics is progressive but who also considers himself as anti-communist, I don’t see the above generational politics as being irrelevant. In fact, I see generational politics as the “Achilles’ heel” to the Vietnamese American community development.
The question then is how to frame generational politics in a way that can produce optimal outcomes for the community.
Contextualizing the anti-communist identity
It has already been observed that Vietnamese refugees are able to do what F. Scott Fitzgerald stated as the test of a first-rate intelligence. That is, as noted by writer Andrew Lam, the first generation has “the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.”
In other words, Vietnamese refugees have not abandoned the ideological struggle for a unified non-communist, democratic Vietnam. Yet, at the same time, they have continued to interrelate new and old cultural ways in order to build a new place for the family and community. In effect, new ways of doing things that have proven to be successful will be a reference for others to emulate.
Similarly, while many Vietnamese refugees are intolerant of the communist regime or those who they perceived to have directly sustained or apologized for communist rule, such anti-communist sentiment does not necessarily breeds intolerance of attitude toward other dislikes.
In fact, like other immigrant groups, Vietnamese refugees have further developed self-expression values, such as tolerance toward “outgroups,” support for gender equality, emphasis less on materialist values, support on environmental activism, and high levels of negative views toward authoritarian governments; whereas those with survival values tend to have the opposite preferences on these topics. My research on Houston’s Vietnamese community using the Houston Asian Area Survey shows that the older generations, with time, are more likely to support gays in the military, to approve relatives marrying non-Asian, agree that there is too little done to protect the environment and to make improvements for the poor, and to volunteer for a non-Asian charity. Moreover, when I compare Vietnamese immigrants to other Asian immigrants of the same age and time in the U.S., Vietnamese immigrants have a better score on these indicators.
However, for a number of Vietnamese American studies scholars and activists, the anti-communist identity should be viewed through a critical theory perspective. In critiquing, they conclude that such ideology and identity are impediment to community development, community organizing, or transnational collaborative exchanges.
For example, scholar Linda Vo states:
Homeland politics is still of primary importance, and adopting anti-Communism ideologies is mandatory…These men understandably have a difficult time forgetting the past, for they committed their younger years fighting in the war…only to be relocated to another country where they face social, economic, and political displacement…[whose] peers have moved on with their lives, busily pursuing the American dream, their wives have become independent, their children disrespectful…a new generation is coming to terms with this history [the Vietnam War and its aftermath] in their own ways, extending themselves beyond the ’survival and silence’ mode of their parents’ generation.
In a commentary, a group of critical scholars argued that, while anti-communist leaders are right to point out the lack of freedom of speech and human rights in Vietnam, such “focus is compelled very much by an obsession about a war that ended long ago, and blinds us to many other problems today…[with] nothing to say beyond blaming communism.”
Is the critical perspective right about the effects of the anti-communist identity?
On the one hand, when anti-communism is viewed within a period of time and within the construction of symbolic meaning, the unit of analysis would be of individuals persistent about their identity. That is, the inability of particular group to let go of the past, which is highlighted by their protests against the naming of a Vietnamese American business area as “Vietnam Business District” or the opening of a Vietnam’s consulate office in or near their community. From this view, the culture of anti-communism is unprogressive.
On the other hand, when anti-communism is viewed across time and through the process of “meaning making,” the unit of analysis is a practice or a pattern of activities carried out by individuals acting in context. In this way, the anti-communist identity is subject to being produced and reproduced by individuals in order to reach some form of optimal outcome.
For example, “fighting communism” in general is no longer pursued by military means but by peaceful means, such as utilizing the political process and lobbying for human rights and democracy in Vietnam. Moreover, the anti-communist identity has also been redefined by the “normalization” between the U.S. and Vietnam and the greater internationalization of the latter. As a result, activities relating to Vietnam now include travels, work, volunteering, commerce, social connections, and retirement. In fact, a study conducted in 2000 showed that 60 percent of Vietnamese Americans said they would return to live in Vietnam if the country was free and democratic.
It is also probable that in the near future building relations with private entities – including academic, cultural, and economic – who are more or less “independent” from the state will be accepted. There are now a number of Vietnamese Americans who are on the front line of this movement.
For example, scholar and community activist Le Xuan Khoa noted that overseas Vietnamese “haven’t really been calm and objective enough…in reviewing the past to learn new lessons,” while the communist government “has changed its attitude toward Vietnamese refugees, from denouncing them as ‘traitors’ to ‘an important resource’ for the development of the country.” However, Khoa also recognized that the communist regime has yet to admit their past mistakes. That government’s policy toward the overseas communities remains simply a strategy “designed by the winners trying to convert the losers to their side” but as such contributions by overseas Vietnamese are “directed only toward in improving the lives of people in the country and facilitating the process of change, not to support the government or regime.”
Among those who have who worked in the Vietnamese state sector, some have been able to reconcile their working relationship with the one-party state and their belief in “development as freedom.” For example, Dr. Do Duc Cuong, who had been a banking expert in the US, was to be honored by a state-run newspaper’s Vietnam Glory Award for Viet Kieu who have made outstanding contributions to Vietnam. In an interview which appeared in the state-run newspaper, Do stated that he was willing to work for any bank that met three requirements: “First, it had to have flexible leaders who are open to discussion and opinions that are not their own. Secondly, it had to have a good strategy for healthy competition, and thirdly, there could be no embezzlement or corruption within the organization.” Also in the interview, Do declined accepting the Vietnam Glory Award, citing that his contribution to his homeland was not to seek any official recognition.
Notwithstanding, for many Vietnamese refugees, any activities that are thought to directly sustain or apologize for communist rule in Vietnam are still subject to harsh criticisms and protests.
Overall, persistence and change are part and parcel of the anti-communist identity. Clearly, what persists is the belief that Vietnam should be a non-communist, democratic nation and that the heritage symbols of the former Republic of South Vietnam must be commemorated and honored. Meanwhile, what is subject to change is how to make Vietnam into a “free and democratic” nation.
The social action of the anti-communist identity
Often overlooked is that group identity does have certain functions which contribute to the group’s mobility.
For example, the common experience of being “pushed out” by communist rule can be a powerful motivational force in making resources available to members of the group, and such force can be an effective method to mobilize for collective action. That is, group solidarity can further facilitate sources for mutual assistance, information channels, patchworking and credit associations, fundraising, and organized demonstrations to make policy claims.
There is also strong evidence to suggest that the anti-communist identity through active engagement in protests/demonstrations has encouraged the first-generation of Vietnamese Americans to register, to vote, and to bloc vote for Vietnamese candidates on both local and state levels. Although such activities are spurred by interests in homeland affairs, they “can facilitate first-generation incorporation, thereby helping to make newly arrived migrant groups more engaged as American citizens,” according to an empirical study by Christian Collet and Hiroko Furuya.
To be sure, group solidarity can also be the source of exclusion, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and “putting the communist hat on someone.” In the early 1980s, when anti-communism ran so deep, a number of Vietnamese American journalists became victims of suspected assassinations. According to media reports, from 1981 to 1990, there were five suspected assassinations, one was from Houston (TX), two from California, and two from Fairfax (VA); these assassinations were thought to be linked to anti-communist groups and of which all five murder cases remain unsolved.
For critical scholars and activists, the above calls for a new ideology, one based on progressive ideas. It is argued that a new progressive identity would prepare Vietnamese Americans for the future instead of trying to change the past. As such, a progressive ideology would facilitate coalition building with other minority groups to fight against poverty, mental illness, youth delinquency, and discrimination; in the age of globalization, it would also facilitate normalization and reconciliation with Vietnam.
To be sure, individuals personifying progressive values can bridge the generational gulf in the Vietnamese American community, as well as redefining relationship with Vietnam.
Based on two exploratory surveys I conducted in 2004 and 2005, I found younger Vietnamese Americans – those who are “consumers” of community activities – do define differently on what is “anti-communism” relative to the leaders of the community. Moreover, these young adults appear to have a great deal of trust, social obligation, concern for domestic issues, and interests of encouraging Vietnam to improve its policy on human rights.
With such views and outlooks, younger Vietnamese Americans can be mobilized by particular groups focusing on either domestic or homeland issues. And if we were to casually imply that these young individuals would one day be activists and leaders of the community, there is then support that the anti-communist identity is capable of facilitating community development, community organizing, and transnational collaborative exchanges.
However, in practice, bridging the generational gap and facilitating engagement with Vietnam is most challenging. This is because they require not only individuals who are bilingual with cultural skills, but also the understanding of the ideological struggle since 1945 from both the anti-communist and communist perspectives.
Conclusion: Anti-communist identity is what Vietnamese Americans make of it
The protest over the “F.O.B II: Art Speaks” illustrates that the exhibit’s organizers and advisory board members, who saw themselves as bridging the gap between the first and second generation, could not produce optimal outcomes.
I believe that, in part, the shortcoming is because the art exhibit was perceived to challenge, test, or transcend the anti-communist identity. The exhibit could not effectively bridge the generational politics or facilitate a dialogue on freedom of expression because it did not fully appreciate the dynamics and function of the anti-communist identity; however, for organizers, the exhibit did facilitate dialogue, which “occurred in ways that are not easily recorded or do not make good news events.”
As mentioned above, a trait unique to Vietnamese Americans is their ability to organize protests and demonstrations easily and effectively in stating their policy preference, especially on homeland issues. For some scholars, the key question is whether mobilization on homeland issues provides a foundation for subsequent political mobilization on domestic issues or whether it serves as a distraction from it.
In my observation of politics in the Vietnamese American community, there is an emerging trend in which a growing number of individuals/organizations who are able to “redefine” the anti-communist identity. That they are able to organize progressive social and political domestic agendas of which are supported by older leaders/organizations. These individuals tend to be those who are bilingual and who have both feet in the Vietnamese American community and in the social and cultural world of American society and Asian America.
Some of their progressive social and political domestic efforts can be seen in the mobilization of the San Jose’s Vietnamese community after a police shooting of a young mother in July 2003 of which a formal dialogue was created between the community and city elected officials and the police department; fundraising for Tsunami Victims in early 2005 where more than $850,000 were raised by Vietnamese Americans across state lines; the statewide effort among various Vietnamese American organizations to help their fellow Vietnamese Katrina/Rita victims establish new lives; and the Vietnamese American Heritage Project led by both young and old scholars at the Smithsonian.
There are also efforts to integrate both domestic and homeland politics. A case in point is the Viet-Vote Campaign 2003 in Boston. This campaign “worked to connect desires for Vietnamese voice, power, and representation with critical local issues ranging from crime and jobs to affordable housing and bilingual education.” At the same time, the campaign’s domestic agenda complements an overall strategy in “gaining recognition of the flag from the former Republic of South Viet Nam as the ‘official’ flag of the Vietnamese community in the City of Boston.” This dual-campaign has proven to be successful in carrying out its objectives.
The above efforts underscore the need to look at the anti-communist identity under a different framework, since the anti-communist identity is not necessarily limited in addressing the needs of Vietnamese Americans and their communities, although it can be fragile and does have negative externalities.
In sum, it is important to look at who is currently organizing (or transcending) the anti-communist identity, under what context is the person/group acting and for what purpose. Moreover, how or who do these activities include or exclude and whether they produce some form of optimal outcomes or create greater division.
Ong, N., & Meyer, D. (2004).
Protest and Political Incorporation: Vietnamese American Protests, 1975-2001. The eScholarship Repository,
- What is the difference between cultural assimilation and political incorporation?
- Explain the frequency and location of Vietnamese American protests.
- Will the second generation of Vietnamese in
Nguyen, Ngoc Bich (2006).
Immigration and Integration: The Vietnamese Experience. This presentation was made at the
- What is the difference between the overseas community in the East and the overseas community in the West?
- Explain why the overseas Vietnamese are not dupe. That they are not about to fall into the trap of the The Red Riding Hood story when the wolf, imitating the grandmother, pipes lavish praise into the ears of Little Red Riding Hood as to how wonderful she is or looks.
- Why does the success of overseas Vietnamese represent a huge challenge to the communist system in
